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 2 
Do Deep and Comprehensive Regional Trade Agreements help in 
Reducing Air Pollution? 
 
Abstract 
Environmental concerns are increasingly being incorporated into regional trade agreements (RTAs) to 
promote environmental quality and ultimately ensure compatibility between trade and environmental 
policies. This occurs in a context where air pollution and its effects on human health are of major 
concern. This paper investigates whether the proliferation and depth of environmental provisions (EPs) 
in RTAs are associated with lower concentration levels of particulate matter. We present an index of 
EPs in RTAs that measures the breadth and depth of the provisions and use it to estimate the effect of 
ratifying RTAs with different levels of EPs on changes in PM2.5 concentration levels in a panel of 
OECD countries over the 1999–2011 period. Using an instrumental variables strategy, we find that 
countries that have ratified RTAs with EPs show lower levels of PM2.5 concentrations when we control 
for scale, composition and technique effects and for national environmental regulations. Moreover, the 
PM2.5 concentration levels in the pairs of countries that belong to an RTA with EPs tend to converge 
for the country sample. The results also hold for a longer period of time (1990–2011) and a broader 
sample of 173 countries as well as for other pollutants, namely CO2 and NO2. 
1. Introduction 
The interactions between international trade and environmental quality have been 
widely recognized by scholars (Grossman and Krueger, 1991, Antweiller et al., 2001; 
Copeland and Taylor, 2003; López & Islam, 2008) and policy actors since the early 
1990s. Trade and the environment was already identified as a relevant area in the 
1992 Rio Earth Summit and also referred to in the Rio +20 agreement, in which more 
action was required to ensure that countries could pursue development policies with 
the necessary environmental protection to ensure a sustainable path of economic 
growth and social progress.  
The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs), with more than 250 RTAs in 
effect in 2014, has been reinforced by slow progress in the multilateral negotiation 
arena, in both trade and environmental issues. Whereas recent RTAs usually refer to 
environmental quality, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has not always 
 3 
succeeded in integrating environmental issues in multilateral trade negotiations
1
, 
usually leaving these issues to environmental multilateral agreements (MEAs). Until 
now, MEAs have been focused on particular aspects related to global (e.g. Kyoto) and 
local climate change (Montreal Protocol), or conservation and biodiversity (CITES), 




An increasing number of recently ratified RTAs have introduced environmental 
provisions (EPs) in the main text of the RTAs or in accompanying side agreements. 
These provisions aim to protect the environment and establish methods of 
collaborating on environmental issues (Morin and Jinnah, 2018; Yoo and Kim, 2015). 
The breadth and depth of the provisions vary widely by agreement. At a minimum, 
new RTAs tend to incorporate environmental issues in the preamble or in some 
articles dealing with investment issues or exceptions. Other RTAs include a chapter 
dedicated exclusively to environmental matters, whereas in some cases, 
environmental aspects are covered in a side agreement
3
.  
This paper advances the current status of the literature body on the nexus of 
international trade, trade agreements and the environment in two fronts. First, by 
categorizing RTAs according to the breadth and the depth of the EPs included in the 
RTAs or in the corresponding side agreements. This categorization is new
4
, 
theoretically reliable, replicable and justifiable and is used to further investigate the 
effects of trade agreements on environmental quality. Second, we focus on the effect 
of RTAs with EPs on PM2.5
5
 population weighted concentrations and explore whether 
the inclusion of most comprehensive EPs in RTAs is associated with higher air quality 
in the ratifying countries, than in countries members of RTAs with less or no EPs. 
                                                     
1
There are, however, some exceptions. Some environmental issues are being discussed under Doha and 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the Appellate Body have ruled on several trade and 
environmental disputes since the WTO’s inception, creating an interesting precedent.  
2
 An excellent survey is presented in Mitchell, 2003. Although numerous studies have investigated the 
effectiveness of MEAs (e.g. Breitmeier, 2011; Helm . and Sprinz, 2000; Michell, 2006), no clear 
correlation has been established between the operation of the MEAs and the state of the environment. 
3
 Since 2007, the OECD has undertaken regular reviews of how environmental issues are treated in 
trade agreements (OECD, 2007) and providing and updating an inventory of RTAs with environmental 
provisions (EPs) (Gallagher and Serret, 2010 and 2011; George, 2013, 2014a and 2014b). The OECD 
reports refer to some ex-post assessments of environmental impacts (e.g. EU-Chile and the US for the 
RTAs recently signed (George, 2013)) and mention the difficulty in isolating the impact of the RTAs 
on environmental outcomes from other factors. 
4
 Morin and Jinnah (2018) assess climate-related provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), 
but only along four dimensions. 
5
 PM2.5 refers to atmospheric particulate matters (PM) that have a diameter of less than 2.5 micrometer. 
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Small airborne particles are among the most policy relevant pollutants. It is widely 
recognized that PM2.5 imposes a substantial burden on human health. Large cohort-
based studies conducted by epidemiologists have provided evidence since at least 25 
years that pollution by PM2.5 increases the rate of death, especially through increases 
in respiratory and heart diseases
6
.  
The existing literature investigating the effects of RTAs on emissions (Baghdadi, 
Martínez-Zarzoso and Zitouna, 2013; Ghosh and Yamarik, 2006; Zhou et al., 2017) 
only distinguishes between RTAs with or without EPs, but misses an important aspect 
of the distinction between agreements according to the level of EPs and their 
enforceability. We depart from it by including the breadth and depth of EPs in a model 
of the determinants of emissions, which is estimated using panel data and dynamic 
panel data techniques over the 1999-2011 period for OECD+BRIIC countries as well 
as for a global sample. This analysis is carried out within the context of the RTAs that 
went into effect over the study period.  
Our main results indicate that countries that have ratified RTAs with EPs show lower 
levels of PM2.5 concentrations when we control for scale, composition and technique 
effects and for national environmental regulations. Moreover, the PM2.5 
concentrations in the pairs of countries that belong to an RTA with EPs tend to 
converge for the country sample. The results also hold for a longer period of time 
(1990-2011) and a broader sample of 173 countries as well as for other pollutants. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
impact of trade liberalization and RTAs on the environment. Section 3 presents the 
empirical framework and the modelling strategy while also outlining the methodology 
used to categorize EPs in RTAs and highlights the resulting categorisation. Section 4 
presents and discusses the main empirical results. Finally, Section 5 draws some 
conclusions.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on the Environment 
The impact of trade liberalisation on the environment is a controversial topic. 
Increasing openness and trade generates a mixture of potential positive and negative 
                                                     
6
 Calculations based on existent studies suggest that ambient (outdoor) PM2.5 caused about 3 million 
deaths worldwide in 2012 (Cohen et al., 2017; World Health Organization, 2016). 
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effects on the environmental and natural resources of countries. For this reason, the 
interactions between trade and the environment have been widely investigated by 
economists in the last two decades. 
Early on, Grossman and Krueger (1991) focused on the environmental effects the 
North American Free Trade Agreement had when it went into effect and decomposed 
the environmental impact of trade liberalization into scale, technique and composition 
effects. This decomposition has been frequently used by the subsequent related 
literature 
 
(Antweiller et al., 2001; Stoessel, 2001; Cole and Elliot, 2003; Lopez & 
Islam, 2008), with some authors stating that when trade is liberalized all of these 
effects interact with each other (Copeland and Taylor, 2003; Managi et al., 2009).  
  The scale effect indicates that an increase in global economic activity due to 
an increase in trade raises the total amount of pollution and, as a consequence, creates 
environmental damages. Thus, the scale effect is expected to have a negative impact 
on the environment. However, the evidence from the literature also reports that higher 
incomes have a positive effect on environmental quality (Grossman and Krueger, 
1995; Copeland and Taylor, 2004). This suggests that when assessing the effects of 
growth and trade on the environment, we cannot automatically hold trade responsible 
for environmental damage (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). Since increasing incomes per 
capita are usually associated with a greater demand for environmental quality and in 
turn foster beneficial changes in environmental policy, the net impact on the 
environment remains unclear.  
This argument is linked to the so-called environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), 
which basically hypothesizes the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between environmental quality and per capita income. The EKC hypothesis states that 
environmental quality first decreases and then rises with increasing income per capita 
(Stern, 2004). In the last decades, numerous empirical studies have tested for the 
existence of an EKC (please see Dinda (2004), Carson (2010) and Stern (2004, 2014) 
for a summary of the empirical literature). The literature concludes that for pollutants 
with local and more short-term impacts, a significant EKC is more likely to hold than 
for global and long-term pollutants (Dinda, 2004; Carson, 2010). In line with Carson 
(2010), we argue that the focus should be shifted to the mechanisms and transmission 
channels that affect the income-environmental quality relationship. 
The technique effect is expected to have a positive impact on the environment. 
Researchers widely agree that trade is responsible for technology transfers and new 
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technology should benefit the environment if pollution per output is reduced. A 
reduction in the emission intensity results in a decline in pollution, holding constant 
the scale of the economy and the mix of goods produced. Recent studies suggest that 
this effect can, in some cases, prevail over the scale effect (Levinson, 2015). 
Finally, the impact of the composition effect of trade on the environment, 
namely the effect of a change in the basket of products exported after trade 
liberalization, is ambiguous. Trade based on comparative advantage results in 
countries specialising in the production and trade of those goods that a country is 
relatively efficient at producing. On the one hand, if a comparative advantage results 
from differences between countries in environmental regulations, countries could 
benefit economically from having lax regulations, resulting in possible environmental 
damage. The pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) predicts that trade liberalisation in 
goods leads to the relocation of pollution-intensive production from high-income 
countries with more stringent environmental regulations to low-income countries with 
lax environmental regulations. Developing countries could therefore enjoy a 
comparative advantage in pollution-intensive products and become pollution havens. 
On the other hand, if factor endowments are the main source of comparative 
advantage, the factor endowment hypothesis (FEH) claims that countries where 
capital is relatively abundant will export capital-intensive (dirty) goods. This 
stimulates production while increasing pollution in capital-rich countries. Countries 
where capital is scarce will see a fall in pollution given the contraction of the 
pollution generating industries.  
Thus, the economic theory predicts that the composition effect of liberalised 
trade on the environment depend on the distribution of comparative advantages across 
countries. Earlier studies using aggregate trade did not find much evidence of a 
pollution haven effect. Nevertheless, new studies using more disaggregate data, and 
accounting for endogeneity issues and spillovers, tend to find some support for it 
(Broner, Bustos and Carbalho, 2012; Millimet and Roy, 2015; Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 
2016). 
In summary, the theoretical literature in economics identifies the existence of 
both positive and negative effects of the liberalisation of trade on the environment. 
The positive effects include increased growth and technology transfers accompanied 
by the distribution of environmentally safe, high-quality goods, services and 
technology. The negative effects stem from the relocation of pollution-intensive 
 7 
economic activities in countries with lax environmental regulations that could 
potentially threaten the regenerative capabilities of ecosystems while increasing the 
danger of depleting natural resources.  
Most of the empirical literature has used changes in trade openness as a proxy 
for trade liberalisation (Antweiller et al., 2001; Cole and Elliot, 2003; Frankel and 
Rose, 2005; Managi et al., 2009). Roy (2017) is the only paper using intra-industry 
trade instead of overall trade. The main empirical findings point to net positive effects 
of overall trade on the environment and overall trade appears to be less pro-
environment than intra-industry trade (Roy, 2017). The explanation for this net 
positive effect is that trade encourages innovation, speeds the absorption of new 
technologies and could also bring clean production techniques from more 
technologically advanced countries to the less advanced.  
Surprisingly, few studies have been devoted so far to regional trade 
agreements (RTAs), except in the case of NAFTA (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; 
Stern, 2007; Cherniwchan, 2017). Cherniwchan (2017) finds that, on average, about 
two-thirds of the reduction in PM10 emissions from the manufacturing sector in the 
United States can be attributed to NAFTA’s trade liberalization. To the best of our 
knowledge, only two more empirical studies have used RTAs instead of trade 
openness as a trade policy variable that could influence pollution levels or 
environmental outcomes in general (Ghosh and Yamarik, 2006; and Baghdadi et al., 
2013). These two studies are described in detail in the next sub-section. 
However, it is worth noting that numerous studies in the field of international 
relations and political science have focused on the impact of RTAs on the 
environment in the Asian region (Vutha and Jalilian, 2008; and Yoo and Kim, 2015) 
and on the relation between the design of RTAs and environmental governance (e.g. 
Jinnah, 2011; Morin and Jinnah, 2018). Vutha and Jalilian (2008) focused on 
evaluating the possible impacts of trade on the environment, choosing ASEAN-China 
Free Trade Area (ACFTA)
7
 as a case study to illustrate the relationship between 
RTAs and trade, and the implications of RTA-induced changes in trade flows on the 
environment. The authors state that they cannot offer any firm conclusion on the 
interaction between RTAs, trade and the environment for this specific case study 
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 The ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), also known as China–ASEAN Free Trade Area is a 
free trade area among the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and the People's Republic of China. 
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given the complexity of the interlink and the limited data available after the 
ratification.  
Moreover, Yoo and Kim (2015) argue that recent RTAs have tended to enhance 
environmental cooperation among participating countries. Focusing in particular on 
the environmental policy changes in South Asian countries associated with the 
creation of its association agreements with ASEAN, the study concludes that each free 
trade agreement has incrementally developed environmental cooperation, especially 
when integrated into a vision for regional integration. Referring to the agreement 
between Peru and the US, Jinnah (2011) noticed that recently negotiated RTAs with 
EPs have the potential to enhance environmental regime effectiveness in ways that 
have been impossible under environmental treaties alone. Finally, Morin and Jinnah 
(2018) assess climate-related provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
along four dimensions, namely innovation, legalization, replication and distribution. 
They find that some climate provisions are more specific and enforceable than some 
multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Kyoto protocol or the Paris 
Agreement. They assess the distribution of climate change provisions in PTAs by 
investigating whether they correlate with the level of emissions and find a negative 
correlation between levels of CO2 emissions and the average number of climate 
change provisions in PTAs. 
2.2 The Impacts of RTAs on the Environment 
The first published study evaluating the quantitative impact of RTAs on the 
environment was Ghosh and Yamarik (2006). The authors proposed and estimated an 
empirical model where trade, growth and RTAs are linked and in which RTAs can 
have a direct and an indirect effect on the environment (through increasing trade and 
growth). Their empirical approach combines three well-known modelling strategies in 
the economics literature. First, the gravity model of trade, which has been considered 
the workhorse of empirical trade modelling since the early 1990s (Feenstra, 2016), is 
used to estimate the determinants of bilateral trade flows. Second, growth in GDP per 
capita is modelled following the growth-empirics literature that considers trade 
openness as one of the key factors in explaining economic growth (Frankel and 
Romer, 1990; Doyle and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2011). Finally, the above-mentioned 
literature linking trade with growth and environmental quality, based on the seminal 
work of Grossman and Krueger (1991) and Antweiller et al. (2001), is used to 
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estimate the determinants of environmental degradation. As a proxy for degradation, 
three indicators of air quality (suspended particulate matter, sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen dioxide) and four types of resource utilization (carbon dioxide per capita, 
percentage change in deforestation, energy depletion per capita and water pollution 
per capita) are considered. They apply ordinary least squares (OLS) in combination 
with instrumental variable estimation techniques (IV), the latter being used to control 
for the endogeneity of trade and income, to a sample of 151 countries in 1995 (using 
bilateral trade data for 1990). The main findings show that membership in RTAs 
reduces pollution by raising trade and income per capita, indicating that there is an 
indirect positive effect on environmental quality. In contrast, no evidence is found for 
the existence of a direct effect; for instance, they do not find any evidence that 
membership in RTAs itself affects environmental outcomes.  
There are three main limitations to Ghosh and Yamarik’s (2006) findings. First, 
it is based on data for a single year and therefore is unable to include the dynamics or 
to control for unobserved factors that are country-specific and time-invariant. Second, 
and perhaps the main shortcoming, is that the authors do not explain the mechanism 
through which the membership in RTAs could affect the environment. Finally, a third 
limitation is that there are important differences among RTAs in the way they take 
into account environmental issues. Whereas some RTAs include an extensive range of 
EPs (e.g. Canada-Panama), others are limited to confirming the general exceptions of 
GATT (art XIV and XIV) or exceptions for specific chapters (e.g. Australia-Malaysia). 
The two first issues are tackled in Baghdadi et al. (2013). Their approach 
refines and extends the modelling strategy applied in Ghosh and Yamarik (2006) by 
considering not only trade and GDP growth as endogenous variables, but also 
membership in RTAs. Moreover, the models are estimated for a panel-data set of 182 
countries over the period from 1980 to 2008 and the endogeneity of the RTA variable 
is addressed by using matching and difference in differences (DID) techniques. The 
most remarkable departure from Ghosh and Yamarik (2006) is that Baghdadi et al. 
(2013) introduce the idea that if a direct positive effect of RTAs on the environment 
exists, it should only be found for those agreements that specifically include 
environmental provisions (EPs) in the main text of the trade agreement, or for those 
that are accompanied by side environmental agreements, as in the case of NAFTA
8
. 
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 Ghosh and Yamarik (2006) just mention that regional trade agreements address environmental issues 
and give the examples of NAFTA and the EU (page 20, second paragraph: “Whatever the route 
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The direct effect is explained by the fact that EPs in RTAs will encourage members to 
apply and enforce more stringent environmental regulations and these should in turn 
enhance environmental quality. Hence, the link with regulations should induce an 
improvement in environmental outcomes independent of the trade-induced effect and 
even for similar levels of environmental regulations. In their paper, a distinction is 
made between RTAs membership in agreements with and without EPs. A limitation of 
this study is that EPs are very heterogeneous, with some RTAs including very detailed 
provisions and others only mentioning the environment in the investment chapter (e.g. 
OECD, 2007). Hence, modelling this using a dummy variable is over-simplistic. 
Moreover, a measure of national environmental regulations is missing in the analysis. 
The methodology in Baghdadi et al. (2013) consists of modelling per-capita 
CO2 emissions as a function of population, land area per capita, GDP per-capita, trade 
and RTAs. Since there could be reverse causality between the independent and the 
dependent variables, they assume that GDP per-capita and the trade variables are 
endogenously determined. The authors use instrumental variables (IV) techniques to 
estimate GDP per-capita (with a model borrowed from the growth-empirics literature) 
and trade (using a gravity model) and address RTA endogeneity due to self-selection 
into agreements using matching econometrics in combination with DID. To test 
whether countries’ CO2 emissions trajectories converge, a model for per-capita 
emissions is first estimated in relative terms using the log of carbon dioxide emissions 
per capita (log of CO2 emissions of country i relative to country j in period t, 
Emit/Emjt) as the dependent variable and expressing GDP per-capita, land area per-
capita and population also in relative terms. Next, the model is also estimated in 
absolute terms to examine the direct effect of RTAs on absolute pollution levels. In 
this case, the RTA variable is generated as a weighted average, using emissions in the 
partner countries as weights. 
The main results obtained from estimating the emissions model in relative 
terms provide evidence that RTAs with EPs statistically explain the convergence of 
CO2 levels across pairs of countries. Moreover, the agreements that specifically 
include provisions to ensure enforcement (NAFTA) are converging at a higher rate 
than others (EU), which leave compliance measures to the legal system. Conversely, 
RTAs without EPs do not affect relative pollution levels, indicating that controlling 
                                                                                                                                                        
through which trading blocs impact the environment, regional trading arrangements are addressing 
environmental issues...”). 
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for bilateral trade levels and overall openness, the trade policy variable (membership 
of RTAs) does not have a direct effect on emissions convergence for this type of 
agreements. The findings indicate that CO2 emissions are around 0.3 percent lower for 
countries that have RTAs with EPs, whereas the effect is not statistically significant 
for countries with RTAs without EPs. Hence, CO2 emissions converge to a lower level 
when both countries belong to the same RTA and the RTA includes EPs. With respect 
to the trade-environment link, the results do not show a significant effect of trade 
openness on the absolute levels of carbon dioxide emissions. 
More recently, in Zhou et al. (2017) an attempt is made to replicate Baghdadi 
et al. (2013) study using as dependent variable PM2.5 concentration levels instead of 
CO2. They presented estimates of the effect of countries participating in RTAs (with 
or without EPs) on emissions using a sample of 136 countries over a period of 10 
years. They find that RTAs with environmental provision terms are likely to be 
associated with a lower level of PM2.5 concentrations and facilitate the convergence 
of PM2.5 concentrations between contracting countries.  However, Zhou et al. (2017) 
included only countries with RTAs in most of their estimations and made only a 
distinction between RTAs with or without EPs without considering RTAs according to 
the level of EPs and their enforceability.  
 
3. Analytical Framework and Empirical Analysis  
In this section we present the analytical framework proposed to investigate the 
effect of EPs in RTAs on emissions, describe the target variables and construction of 
the environmental provision score and outline the modelling strategy. The main 
modelling strategy is partly based on Baghdadi et al. (2013) and consists of extending 
their approach to estimate the effects of trade and RTAs on a local pollutant using 
panel data and controlling for environmental regulations. The pollutant considered is 
particulate matter (PM2.5)
9
, which is used as the dependent variable in the empirical 
models. The corresponding explanatory variables and data sources are described in 
the data section below. 
 
3.1 Analytical Framework 
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 We use PM2.5 instead of SPM in this study. SPM refers to particles in the air of all sizes, whereas 
PM2.5, usually called fine particles, are not visible to the eye and are more harmful for health. 
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Our analytical framework is based on the formal model-based definitions of 
the concepts of scale, composition and technique effects (Copeland and Taylor, 1994). 
It is also inspired by theories developed by Copeland and Taylor (2004) and 
Antweiller et al. (2001) relating trade and environmental regulations with 
environmental quality.  
Copeland and Taylor (2004) linked the environmental impact of trade 
liberalization to a country’s comparative advantage, to the choice of policy 
instruments and to the flexibility of the instruments. The authors noted that when 
analyzing the effects of trade and growth on environmental quality, one must account 
for endogenous policy responses. They found theoretical support for the hypothesis 
that more stringent regulations will have an effect on trade flows. However, trade 
theory suggests that many other factors, in addition to pollution regulation, will affect 
trade flows.  
Antweiller et al. (2001) presented an explicit pollution demand-and-supply 
model that divides trade’s impact on pollution concentrations into scale, technique 
and composition effects, with these effects varying across countries. The model 
allows income differences and factor abundance differences to jointly determine trade 
patterns. Their model predicts that the full effect of trade on pollution may be positive 
or negative, depending on the relative factor endowment of the country and on the 
strength of the technique and scale effects.  
Based on these theories, we take into account and introduce environmental 
regulations in an empirical framework that explains pollution concentrations with 
country characteristics, trade intensity and trade policy variables.  
We hypothesise that more stringent environmental regulations at the national 
level will reduce local air pollution after they are fully implemented and hence the 
effects will appear after some time. Moreover, for a given level of environmental 
regulations, participating in RTAs with EPs could also help reduce air pollution if the 
EPs provide enforcement mechanisms and encourage the member countries to 
effectively apply their national regulations. However, for RTAs without such 
provisions, countries may be less motivated to effectively enforce their regulations 
and there will be no additional effect on the environmental indicators coming from 
participation in RTAs without EPs.  
3.2. Data sources and variables  
 13 





the period from 1999 to 2011 are used in the main empirical estimations. Moreover, 
we use an extended sample (173 countries) over the period 1990-2011 (data every 5 
years for PM2.5).  
 
Table 1. Description of Environmental Indicators, Data and Sources 
 
The main data for PM2.5 are from the OECD
12
. The variable used is the population 
weighted mean concentration of PM2.5. The data are available for a cross-section of 48 
countries for the period from 1999 to 2011 (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Population Weighted Concentrations of PM2.5 for Selected Countries 
 
Other variables used in the estimations of the empirical models are described in what 
follows. An environmental policy index, which measures the environmental policy 
stringency in OECD countries and has been constructed by the OECD
13
, is used as a 
proxy for policy interventions in the environmental area. The indicator is a composite 
country-specific measure of environmental policy stringency (ESPI). The current 
version of the indicator covers the above-mentioned 24 OECD countries plus the 6 
BRIICS for the period 1990-2012. The indicator is based on scoring stringency of 15 
policy instruments: 12 applying to the energy sector (though often to industry), 2 to 
transport and 1 in waste (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Economy-Wide ESPI Indicator 
 
Bilateral exports are from UN-COMTRADE and data for factors influencing 
bilateral trade, namely country and country pair characteristics are from CEPII. The 
‘gravity’ variables used include distance between capital cities of the trading countries, 
dummy variables for a common language or past colony, exit to the sea, geographic 
size and a common border.  
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 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and United States. 
11
 Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa. 
12
 Data on PM2.5 are elaborated on by the OECD using datafrom the Atmospheric Composition 
Analysis Group (Boys et al., 2014). Available at: http://fizz.phys.dal.ca/~atmos/martin/?page_id=140.  
13
 See Botta and Kozluk (2014). 
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Data for factors explaining income per capita in the growth regressions 
(population growth, school enrolment and the human development index) are from 
the WDI and the Pen World Table 8.1
14
.  
Information concerning RTAs and the EPs included in each agreement has 
been collected from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and from the legal text of 
the agreements obtained from the corresponding government agencies of the 
signatory countries.  
3.2.1 Categorisation of Environmental Provisions in RTAs  
 On the basis of the key types of environmental provisions identified from the 
annual OECD updates on RTAs and the environment, a set of indicators on the degree 
of environmental commitment has been developed for an ex-post assessment of 
environmental provisions in RTAs. Different types of environmental provisions found 
in RTAs have been divided into nine categories for the purpose of this analysis: 
‘General’, ‘Exceptions’, ‘Environmental Law’, ‘Public Participation’, ‘Dispute 
Settlement’, ‘Partnership and Co-operation’, ‘Specific Environmental Issues’, 
‘Implementation Mechanism’ and ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements’. Based 
on these nine key types of environmental provisions, three indicators on the degree of 
environmental commitment have been developed. The indicators are constructed 
using a number of questions relating to the content of the each RTA. Each question 
leads to a 0 or 1 answer (see Appendix 2). The questions are then weighted to give a 
total score for each RTA. Weights are adjusted to reflect the heterogeneity of different 
environmental provisions that may lead to differing impacts on the ultimate 
environmental outcome. In other words, the higher the expected impact of an 
environmental provision is, the higher the weight is given to that category. 
Weightings are adjusted so that there is not undue influence on a final score due to 
one particular over-weighted question or category. The total score for all questions 
across all categories is 100 in order to facilitate conversion of the index to a usable 
normalised variable. Questions are assigned either the breadth or depth label in case 
this will be a distinguishing characteristic in the model. In terms of breadth, the 
indicators aim to measure the degree of attention given to environmental issues in the 
agreement. In terms of depth, they aim to measure the extent to which the legal texts 
bind the parties to adhere to or implement their environmental provisions. 




 This weighting system aims to capture the relative importance of different types of 
provisions. Weights have been assigned based on a review of the OECD and other 
literature relating to the design, prevalence and implementation of environmental 




The ‘general’ category is assigned relatively high weighting because the inclusion of 
either a dedicated environmental chapter or an environmental side agreement (or both) 
is an important statement on the importance of the environment both legally and 
politically. The ‘environmental’ law category is also assigned a heavy weighting 
because these provisions are deemed to be an important means of leverage for RTA 
implementation to have an effect on environmental legislation in contracting parties. 
The Commitment of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) is also regarded 
as a significant environmental provision because they can, in some instances, have 
precedence over trade regulation obligations where there are potential tensions 
between trade liberalization commitments and MEA trade-related measures (van 
Vooren et al., 2013). The obligations of MEAs shall prevail, in case of any 
inconsistency between the provisions and specific trade obligations set out in certain 
multilateral and bilateral environmental agreements.
16
 Considering that incoherence 
between the trade regulations and MEAs is an unresolved issue under the current 
WTO negotiations, this category is given relatively higher weight. Two categories of 
provision that relate to the implementation and operationalization of environmental 
provisions are given a moderate weighting: public participation and the 
implementation mechanism. These provisions have been highlighted in the OECD 
reviews as being important factors in achieving environmental commitments in RTAs. 
These two indicators relate to the actual operation of environmental commitments. 
Given that environmental outcomes would not arise from RTAs without the actual 
operation of the commitments, implementation mechanisms are considered important 
in this scoring method. The creation of a specific body to oversee implementation of 
the environmental provisions of a trade agreement is a factor in ensuring that the 
commitments made in the legal texts are implemented in practice. At the same time, 
the public participation is a fundamental component of the implementation. 
                                                     
15
 Data on the breadth and depth indicators is available from the authors upon request. 
16
 The provision on a legal precedence of MEAs roots from NAFTA in 1994, and presumably under the 
influence of NAFTA, most RTAs signed by Canada provide this provision. 
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Transparency through the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, 
the provision of effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings including 
redress and remedy, is important in ensuring that the environmental provisions in 
RTAs are actually implemented. In this regard, these two commitments are also given 
relatively higher weights. Although the category ‘specific environmental issues’ 
carries an overall higher weight, the category contains a large number of sub-
questions, all of which do not apply to any one particular RTA. Therefore, it would be 
very unlikely for an individual RTA to score a disproportionately high score for this 
category. Moreover, in every category, higher weights were allocated to individual 
questions relating to provisions, which are either binding or enforceable. For this 
purpose, sub-questions relating to ‘enforceability’ or ‘bindingness’ of provisions were 
embedded. Through these provisions, higher scores could be given to RTAs that not 
only mention a topic, but also have a provision that is binding or enforceable. 
Enforceability and bindingness is determined by the language used in these provisions, 
based on the enforceability index developed in Kohl et al. (2016).  E.g. “shall” and 
“commit to” constitute a binding commitment; “strive to”, “encourage” are not 
binding. In contrast, the breadth of criteria in ’Specific environmental issues’ is 
assigned lower rates as they are usually brief statements or aspirations.  
3.3 Modelling Strategy: Environmental-Impact Model 
According to the underlying theories that relate trade with the environment 
(e.g. Antweiller et al., 2001; Copeland and Taylor, 2004), environmental damage 
depends on population, per-capita GDP, openness to trade and RTAs. These variables 
are assumed to control for scale, technique and composition effects
17
. Panel data 
techniques are used to control for the endogeneity of the target variables (RTA, score, 
breadth and depth) in the environmental-impact model, whereas using instrumental 
variables will enable us to address the endogeneity of the income and trade variables. 
We will proceed with the description of the core equations for environmental impact. 
The details of the first step procedures for the instrumental variables estimation are 
explained in Appendix 1. 
                                                     
17
 Our model considers the main factors affecting emissions in line with Frankel and Rose (2005) and 
Baghdadi et al. (2013). Moreover, as in Frankel and Rose (2005) and Ghosh and Yamarik (2006), a 
Kuznets-curve term, namely the square term of the log of income per capita, is added in Model 1.  
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First, to examine the direct effect of RTAs on absolute environmental quality, we 
specify the estimated equation as: 
 
                                       
               
 
                           
                 
 
                  
 
         
           (1) 
 
where Eit, the natural logarithms of population-weighted PM2.5 for country i at time t, 
is the dependent variable
18
. All of the independent variables are also in natural 
logarithms apart from the two RTA variables. Population (Popit) is a proxy for the 
scale effect, GDP per capita predicted from a growth equation (        ) and its 
squared term serve to test the EKC hypothesis that predicts that environmental quality 
eventually increases with income, predicted openness (      ) serves as proxy for the 
composition effect and could be positively or negatively affecting environmental 
quality, as discussed in the previous section. The proxy used for environmental policy 
is the environmental policy stringency index (ESPIit), which is assumed to have a 
positive impact on environmental quality (negative effect on emissions). 
Nrtaenvit=                denotes agreements with EPs and Nrtanenvit=      
           denotes RTAs without EPs. Both variables are generated as a weighted 
average of the variables rtaenvijt (that takes the value of one when countries i and j 
have an RTA with EPs enforced in year t, zero otherwise), and rtanenvijt (that takes 
the value of one when countries i and j have an RTA without EPs enforced in year t, 
zero otherwise). wjt denotes the weights given to the different RTAs, equal weights for 
all agreements are used as default
19
. Hence the variable Nrtaenvit (Nrtanenvit) is the 
sum of the number of trading partners (j) that each country (i) has belonging to RTAs 
with EPs (without EPs), in a given year t. Finally, δt indicates the inclusion of year 
dummy variables (time fixed effects), which also serve as a proxy for the technique 
                                                     
18
 A small part of PM2.5 can be considered as transboundary air pollution. However, there is no data 
available allowing the distinction between what has been emitted in a country and what goes through 
the borders.  
19
 Alternatively, we used bilateral trade lagged two years as weights in equation (1), the results 
remained similar in direction and statistical significance.  Equal weights are selected to facilitate the 
interpretation of the results. 
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effect that is common to all countries
20
. 
Equation (1) will be estimated distinguishing between RTAs with EPs and 
RTAs without EPs. In this way, we are able to test the prediction that only RTAs with 
EPs as a policy variable should affect a given environmental indicator directly, 
whereas RTAs without EPs should only affect the environment through trade or 
income. Next, model (1) is modified to include the described environmental 
commitment index and the depth and the breadth of the environmental commitments 
of the RTAs with EPs.  
Hence, the two dimensions of the provisions, depth and breadth and the overall score 
(described in section 3.2.1), which is the sum of breath and depth, are used separately 
in equation (1) to acknowledge that each of them can have a different effect on the 
given environmental indicators, so three different equations will be estimated.  
 The same IV strategies, as described above, are used to identify the income 
and trade effects on the environment. We also use a panel data strategy
21
 as a way to 
overcome endogeneity issues. 
Second, following Baghdadi et al. (2013) who also tested for the convergence 
of emissions, we estimate a log-linear equation in relative terms in which the 
dependent variable is the log of the level of a given environmental indicator in 
country i relative to country j in period t (        ln(Eit/Ejt)|. The estimated model is 
given by: 
 
                   
     
     
         
         
         
         
        
        
   
       
      
      
         
      
      
                              
                        
(2) 
                                                     
20 We also experimented with specific time trends for different groups of countries and the results 
concerning our target variable remained unchanged. Results are available upon request. 
21
 In a panel data framework, the inclusion of country and time fixed effects as regressors, together 
with the policy variable that identifies the before and after policy intervention (in the case when an 
RTA has begun to be enforced), is equivalent to a difference in differences strategy. See for example 
Galiani et al. (2005). 
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where Popit (Popjt) is the population in terms of the number of inhabitants in country i 
(j) in year t. Landcapit (Landcapjt) is land area in square kilometres per capita, 
         (        ) is predicted GDP per capita at constant US dollars in country i 
(j) in year t.        (      ) refers to the openness ratio measured as predicted 
export- and import-openness ratio in country i (j). ESPIit (ESPIjt) is the environmental 
policy stringency index in country i (j) at year t.            denotes predicted 
bilateral trade between countries i and j in period t (see Appendix A1.2) and rtaenvijt
  
and rtanenvijt are dummy variables that take the value of 1 when countries i and j have 
an RTA enforced in year t with and without EPs, respectively.   
The details of the estimation used to obtain          are outlined in the Appendix 
(A.1.1). Similarly, predicted openness (both bilateral and multilateral) is obtained 
from the estimation of a gravity model of trade using a large dataset on pair-wise 
trade (see Appendix A.1.2). In particular, we use Badinger’s specification of the 
gravity model (Badinger, 2008). The exponent of the fitted values across bilateral 
trading partners is aggregated to obtain a prediction of total trade for a given 
country         , which is used as regressor in model (1). The endogeneity of the 
RTA variable is solved by using panel data techniques as suggested by Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007). As a robustness check, we also estimate a long-run version of 
model (1) in which the estimation technique used is the dynamic Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) for panel data (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 
2000). 
A considerable strength of the GMM method is the potential for obtaining consistent 
parameter estimates in the presence of measurement errors and endogenous right-
hand-side variables. In practical terms, when using panel data, the unobserved 
country-specific component is eliminated by taking the first differences of the left- 
and right-hand-side variables and the endogeneity issue is solved by using the lagged 
values of the levels of the endogenous variables as instruments. The model is 
specified as: 
                                          (3) 
The validity of specific instruments can be tested in the GMM framework by using 
the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. In the context of this research, we 
consider as endogenous variables, the lagged dependent variable (           and the 
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variables related to an RTA with EP (rtaenv, score, breadth and depth) and the 
instruments used are the second and third lagged values in the levels of the respective 
variables. 
 Next, we will examine whether the depth and the breadth of the RTA’s EPs 
contribute to convergence in environmental indicators between pairs of countries 
belonging to the same RTA. The estimated model is based on model (2), where RTAijt 
is replaced by             which measures the EP-commitment score and its two 
dimensions, depth and breadth, of the agreement between countries i and j in year t 
(separate models are estimated for each variable: score, breadth and depth). The rest 
of the variables have been described below equation (2). Modifications of models (1) 
and (2) will be estimated using population-weighted PM2.5 concentrations as the 
dependent variable.  
 
4. Main Results  
This section presents the main results. Models (1) and (2) and their modified 
versions including the commitment index of EPs are estimated for PM2.5 (population 
weighted mean concentrations) and the main results are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
Yearly data for this pollutant are only available starting in 1999 and for a maximum of 
48 countries. Alternatively, data is available at five-year intervals for a sample with 
173 countries. The results we present in Table 2 are for a sample with 29 countries, 
for which the environmental policy proxy is available. The results are very similar to 
those obtained for the 48 sample presented in Appendix 4 (Table A.3.2). The within 
estimator with an autocorrelation term of order (1) is the preferred estimator
22
 and a 
non-linear effect for income is assumed (EKC hypothesis). Column (1) in Table 2 
presents the estimates of the determinants of emissions and includes the variables 
Nrtaenv and Nrtanenv, the number of participants in RTA agreements signed by each 
country and year with and without EPs, respectively. The variable Nrtaenv shows a 
negative and significant coefficient (at the 5% level) indicating that for each 
additional bilateral RTA with EPs (in case of plurilateral agreements, for each 
additional country-member), the mean concentration of PM2.5 decrease by around 0.3 
                                                     
22
 The model is estimated with the Stata command xtregar with fixed effects. Similar results were 
obtained with alternative specifications (e.g xtreg, fe and time dummies). The Hausman test suggested 
that the error term is correlated with time-invariant country heterogeneity, which suggests that only the 
within estimator is consistent. The model was also estimated using group specific time-dummies for 
OECD and non-OECD countries and no significant differences in the results were observed. 
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percent, whereas Nrtanenv is not statistically significant. The negative and significant 
coefficient of only Nrtaenv indicates that RTAs with environmental provisions (EPs) 
have a direct negative effect on PM2.5 concentrations. The ESPI coefficient is also 
negative and statistically significant indicating that an increase in the index of 10 
percent reduces concentrations by around 0.6 percent (this variable was entered with 3 
lags and in general only the third lag is statistically significant, the coefficient shown 
in the table is the sum of the statically significant coefficients).  
 
Table 2. Determinants of PM2.5 Emissions Concentrations 
 
The result for the income variables show evidence of a Kuznets-curve model 
with the squared coefficient of GDP per capita being statistically significant and 
showing the expected negative sign. It indicates that concentrations are negatively 
correlated with GDP per capita for income levels that surpass the turning point, which 
is shown at the bottom of the Table and is around 3.6-4 thousand USD. The sign and 
significance of the target variables Nrtaenv and ln ESPI are almost unchanged, in 
comparison to a model without the squared income term, except for the fact that ln 
ESPI shows a slightly lower coefficient, as expected. The predicted openness variable 
shows a positive coefficient that is always statistically significant at conventional 
levels, indicating that higher levels of trade do increase concentrations of PM2.5. 
However, the magnitude of the effect is close to zero and hence negligible in 
economic terms. For instance, an increase in trade of 100 percent is associated with an 
increase in PM2.5 concentrations of only 0.2 percent. 
In column (2) the target variable is the commitment index explained in the 
previous section. The result indicates that the score is negatively correlated with PM2.5 
concentration levels and the same holds for the two dimensions of the index: breadth 
and depth (columns 3 and 4, respectively), with a higher magnitude observed for the 
coefficient for the depth dimension. An increase in 1 point in the breadth score 
decrease PM2.5 concentrations by around 1.6 percent, whereas the same increase in 
the depth score decrease PM2.5 concentrations by around 3.4 percent. 
Table 3 presents similar results to those shown in Table 2 using the extended 
sample of 173 countries
23
 for which the data are available every 5 years since 1990 
                                                     
23
 The BRIICS countries used in this study hold some interesting policy insight into whether or not 
their membership in RTAs that have EPs leads to lower pollution.  Since India and China are two 
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until 2010 and then yearly until 2012. The results for the variable Nrtaenv (in column 
1) show a negative and statistically significant coefficient (at the 5% level), which 
indicates that for each additional bilateral RTA with EPs, the mean concentration of 
PM2.5 decrease by around 0.5 percent (versus 0.3 percent in Table 2). On the other 
hand, Nrtanenv is also statistically significant (it was not in Table 2) but the effect is 
halved in comparison with the effect of Nrtaenv. The negative and statistically 
significant coefficients of both, RTAs with and without environmental provisions 
(EPs), could be due to the fact that in this case we are not able to control for domestic 
environmental regulations, since the ESPI indicator is only available for the small 
sample of countries used in the main results. It could be that some countries with 
RTAs without EPs also have more stringent regulations than others without RTAs. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of PM2.5 Emissions Concentrations for 173 
Countries  
Table 4 presents the results for convergence in emissions. The dependent 
variable is the ratio of PM2.5 concentrations per capita in natural logarithms. A 
negative sign in the target variables rtaenv (w_score, breath, depth) indicates that 
there is convergence in emissions between countries that participate in RTAs with EPs. 
The result in column (1) indicates that the rate of convergence is 9 percent for a pair 
of countries in RTAs with EPs and 12 percent in agreements without EPs. However, 
once the commitment index and its dimensions, instead of the simple dummy, are 
used as regressors (columns 2 to 4), the corresponding estimated coefficient for RTAs 
without EPs is not statistically significant, whereas the score, breadth and depth 
variables show a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the one percent 
level, indicating convergence in emissions in RTAs with more comprehensive EPs. 
The coefficient of bilateral exports (lexp_predict) is in most cases not statistically 
significant and the ESPI ratio present a negative coefficient indicating that 
convergence in environmental regulations is negatively correlated with convergence 
in emissions of PM2.5. 
                                                                                                                                                        
countries with cities that have some of the worst PM2.5 emission concentrations in the world, their 
membership in RTAs (whether in breadth or depth), which may potentially lower air pollution, can 
provide some interesting policy insight. Of course, given that these are only 6 countries, data 
constraints prevent us from showing the empirical results for these 6 countries in a similar format as 
Tables 2 and 4. However our main results in our extended sample remain unchanged even after 




Table 4. Determinants of Convergence in PM2.5 Emissions 
 
4.3. Robustness 
As a robustness check we use another two pollutants, namely nitrogen oxide (NOx) 
and CO2 to obtain estimates for Model (1) using the same sample of countries as for 
PM2.5 in Table 2. The results are shown in Table A.3.1. The first part of the table 
shows the results for NOx. In this case, only the coefficient of the commitment index 
(w_score) and the breadth and depth components (depth) are statistically significant 
indicating that higher scores of the provisions are negatively correlated with emission 
of NOx; however, the mere membership criteria is not showing a statistically 
significant coefficient. Moreover, the proxy for environmental regulations shows a 
negative but non-significant coefficient, indicating that higher levels of regulatory 
stringency do not have a reducing effect on NOx emissions. As the environmental 
stringency index is a composite of market- and non-market-based policies, it could be 
that it does not capture the specific effect on single pollutants. For further research, it 
should be desirable to use instead of separate components in the index. The second 
part of Table A.3.1 shows the results for CO2. These results are more in line with 
those obtained for PM2.5. On the one hand, we observe negative and statistically 
significant coefficients for the target variables (RTA with EPs, score and its 
dimensions) and on the other hand, the stringency of environmental regulations also 
shows a negative and statistically significant effect on the levels of CO2 emissions. 
Given that CO2 is a global pollutant, this has important policy implications on further 
negotiations of RTAs.  
Model (1) has been also estimated for an extended sample of 48 countries with 
yearly data of population weighted PM2.5 emissions using a panel data model with 
country and time fixed effects and also using a dynamic panel data estimator, namely, 
difference GMM (dif-GMM, Arellano and Bond, 1991). The results are shown in 
Appendix 3 (Tables A.3.2 and A.3.3, respectively).  
In general, the results shown in Table A.3.2 for the 48-country sample confirm 
the results obtained for the smaller sample of 29 countries. The fact that the estimated 
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effects are slightly different in magnitude is not only due to the addition of 19 
countries but also because we are not able to include the ESPI among the regressors
24
. 
The results shown in Table A.3.3 using dif-GMM (with a lagged dependent 
variable and the model in first differences) confirm those obtained with the static 
panel data models indicating that both, membership in RTAs with EPs as well as an 
incremental inclusion of environmental issues in the text of the agreements, contribute 
to improving environmental quality. In general, the dif-GMM long-run estimates in 
Table A.3.3 show stronger effects than the estimates in the main text, which could be 
interpret as short-run effects. 
Finally, In order to check whether spatial dependence across countries affects 
the accuracy of our estimates, we have run the models allowing for standard errors 
that are heteroskedasticity consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional 
(spatial) and temporal dependence
25
. The point estimates are very similar to those 
shown in the main results and in most cases the standard errors are smaller in 
magnitude, providing more accurate estimates.  
A more comprehensive modelling of the spatial dependence of the pollution observed 
is undoubtedly an interesting avenue of future research. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The main results show that RTAs with EPs have a reducing effect on air 
pollution measured using PM2.5 emissions concentrations and also help emissions to 
converge among the participants in the RTAs. The empirical results indicate that a 
direct positive effect of RTAs on reducing air pollution exists, which is mainly present 
for those agreements that specifically include environmental provisions (EPs) in the 
main text of the trade agreement, or for those that are accompanied by side 
environmental agreements. The direct effect could be explained by the fact that the 
EPs in RTAs will encourage members to apply and enforce more stringent 
environmental regulations and these should in turn reduce environmental damage. 
Hence, the link with regulations induces a decrease in environmental degradation 
                                                     
24
 To investigate the effect that excluding ESPI has on the results for the target variables, we estimated 
the model for the sample of 29 countries without ESPI. The estimated coefficients for rtaenv, w_score, 
breadth and depth are -0.0033, -0.0166, -0.0171 and -0.0362, respectively. Hence, these effects are 
shown as an upward bias in the coefficients of the variables (compare with -0.00295, -0.0108, -0.0158 
and -0.0342 in Table 2). 
25
 We would like to thank one anonymous referee for raising this issue. The Stata command xtscc has 
been used, which is appropriate when the time dimension becomes large. The results are available 
upon request from the authors. 
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independent of the trade-induced effect. This effect is also independent from the effect 
induced by other national environmental policies that are summarized in the 
environmental performance index, which is also used as an explanatory variable in the 
regressions. The results also indicate that the content of the EPs also matter for the 
environment. Indeed, the results show that higher levels of environmental regulations 
are also positively correlated with environmental quality. In particular, this is the case 
for PM2.5 emissions concentrations.  
The practice of including provisions that refer to the environment in trade agreements 
is a complementary way to address climate change, environmental degradation and 
related issues that should in any case be discussed at the international level in 
multilateral negotiations. In particular, joint international action is needed to place a 
cap on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the recent outcome of the 2015 United 
Nations Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP21), held in Paris, is an excellent 
starting point. In fact, our results point towards a certain complementary relationship 
between domestic environmental policy and trade policy. This means that in addition 
to stringent environmental regulation, the use of environmental provision in trade 
agreements can improve environmental outcomes. 
Although these findings appear to have important implications for 
environmental provisions in ongoing negotiations of RTAs, we have to bear in mind 
that the analysis is not free from challenges and limitations. For instance, measuring 
the environmental end points in a given country is a difficult exercise. Air emissions 
of PM2.5 are known to be domestic pollutants and may not be a perfect proxy to 
represent environmental quality at the national level. Similarly, air emissions do not 
respect country borders, so measuring air emission concentrations within a small 
country, such as Panama, and relating it to Panama's number of trade agreements, may 
also be a challenge. Even with a focus on air emissions, PM2.5 data is only available 
for around 10 years and enables analysis for only 48 countries, whereas RTAs with 
environmental provisions cover a broader cross-section of countries for a period of 
more than two decades. 
 Finally, the narrow definition of environmental provisions applied in this 
study may affect the results. A broader definition would classify the majority of RTAs 
as those with environmental provisions and may have different implications on the 
analysis. For this reason, we mainly rely on the results using the score rather than on 
those obtained using the number of RTAs. These findings should be validated in 
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future research, given the limitations on data availability in terms of coverage for the 
environmental quality indicators, countries, the time period and the different 
interpretations of environmental provisions in RTAs. 
Further analysis is also needed to shed light on the channels through which 
environmental provisions in RTAs may influence domestic policy processes and 
ultimately the environmental outcomes. The currently existing environmental policy 
stringency indicators are only available for a limited number of countries and do not 
capture the stringency of environmental policy in the developing countries that are 
sought to have improved their environmental policies in accordance with progressive 
environmental provisions in RTAs. Environmental policy indicators that cover both 
developed and developing countries would be required to further develop such 
analysis. In this sense, the current investigation could be extended using proxies for 
environmental regulations (treaties and laws) using a broad sample of countries. 
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Table 1. Description of Variables, Data and Sources  
 Variable name Definition Source Period 
PM 2.5  
 
PM less than 2.5 microns in 
diameter from motor vehicles, 
fossil-fuel power plants, wood 
burning (micrograms per cubic 
meter). Population weighted mean 
concentration 
Boys et al., 2014  
OECD elaboration 
 
Extended sample provided 





NOx NO, NO2, Produced when fossil 
fuels are burnt, main constituent of 
acid rain divided by population. 
(Kt per capita) 






CO2 Primary gas emitted through the 
combustion of fossil fuels and 
industrial processes divided by 
population. (Kt per capita) 
CAIT Climate Data 
Explorer. 2015. Washington, 
DC: World Resources 
Institute. Available online at: 
http://cait.wri.org. 
1990-2011 
ESPI Environmental stringency 
performance index 
Botta and Kozluk (2014) 1990-2011 
Exports  Exports of goods in US$ UN-COMTRADE 1990-2011 
Income per capita 
(GDPcap) 
GDP per capita in US $ per 
inhabitant 
WDI, World Bank 1990-2011 
Population (Pop) Number of inhabitants WDI, World Bank 1990-2011 
RTAs 
(Rtaenv: RTAs 
with EPs, rtanenv: 
RTAs without 
EPs) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
country i and j belong to the same 
RTA, zero otherwise (EP: 
Environmental provisions) 
De Sousa et al 2012 
World Trade Organization 
(WTO) , legal text of the 
agreements 
1990-2011 
Openness (Open) (Exports+Imports)/GDP WDI, World Bank 1990-2011 
Landcap Land area (Area) per capita in 
squared Km per inhabitant 
CEPII 1990-2011 
Dist Lang, Adj, 
Landlok 
 
Gravity variables: Distance 
between capital cities, common 





(ws) , Depth_ws 
and Breadth_ws  
Commitment index of 
environmental provisions, Depth 
and Breadth weighted scores 
Own elaboration using 
information from the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) 








 School2=Secondary School 
 
Investment 



































 denotes the number of countries with whom a given country i trades that are members of the 
same RTA as country i. EP denotes environmental provisions. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Ln denotes natural logarithms. The dependent variable is a population 
weighted mean concentration of PM2.5. Country fixed effects, not reported to save space, are included 
in all columns. Estimation technique is a panel data model with correction for autocorrelation.  
 Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PM2.5     
Independent variables:         
 N
c
 RTAs with EP  -0.00295***    
 [0.00106]    
Weighted EP score   -0.0108**   
  [0.00423]   
Breadth weighted score   -0.0158** 
    [0.00623] 
 Depth weighted score    
 
-0.0342*** 





 RTAs without EP 0.0016 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 
 [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] 
Ln population 0.976** 0.996** 1.000** 0.990** 
 [0.429] [0.434] [0.435] [0.434] 
Ln GDP per capita predicted 2.094*** 2.117*** 2.099*** 2.127*** 
 [0.543] [0.553] [0.555] [0.549] 
(Ln GDP per capita predicted)
2
 -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.128*** 
 [0.0310] [0.0317] [0.0318] [0.0315] 
Ln predicted openness  0.00203*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 
 [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
Ln Environmental Stringency 
Index (3lags) 
-0.0571*** -0.0577*** -0.0571*** -0.0571*** 
F-test Prob. [0.0163] [0.0177] [0.0175] [0.0181] 
GDP Turning point 4062.37 3903.12 3638.11 4058.60 
R
2 
within 0.263 0.258 0.255 0.26 
Number of observations 348 348 348 348 
Number of countries 29 29 29 29 
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Table 3. Determinants of PM2.5 Emissions Concentrations for 173 Countries  
 
  
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PM2.5     
Independent variables: 
    N
c
 RTAs with EP -0.00487*** 
    [0.00115] 
   Weighted EP score 
 
-0.0185*** 
   
 
[0.00625] 







 Depth weighted score  
   
-0.0545*** 
 




 RTAs without EP -0.00251*** 
    [0.000887] 
   Ln population 0.136 0.143 0.143 0.144 
 [0.0957] [0.1000] [0.0997] [0.101] 
Ln GDP per capita 
predicted 0.583** 0.661** 0.661** 0.662** 
 [0.270] [0.275] [0.274] [0.275] 
(Ln GDP per capita 
predicted)
2
 -0.0347* -0.0401** -0.0402** -0.0402** 
 [0.0194] [0.0197] [0.0197] [0.0197] 
Ln predicted openness  0.297 0.385 0.382 0.393 
 
[0.271] [0.306] [0.304] [0.309] 
 Dummy 1995 -0.0579** -0.0683** -0.0681** -0.0688** 
 
[0.0267] [0.0292] [0.0291] [0.0294] 
Dummy 2000 -0.0944*** -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.108*** 
 
[0.0336] [0.0351] [0.0350] [0.0351] 
Dummy 2005 -0.110* -0.138* -0.137* -0.139** 
 
[0.0661] [0.0699] [0.0698] [0.0702] 
Dummy 2010 -0.113 -0.147* -0.146* -0.150* 
 
[0.0833] [0.0872] [0.0872] [0.0873] 
Dummy 2011 -0.139 -0.181 -0.180 -0.185 
 
[0.105] [0.111] [0.111] [0.112] 
Dummy 2012 -0.129 -0.169 -0.168 -0.172 
 
[0.102] [0.108] [0.108] [0.108] 
R
2
 within 0.295 0.273 0.273 0.271 
Number of 
observations 1,172 1,168 1,168 1,168 
Number of countries 173 172 172 172 
Note: N
c
 denotes the number of countries with whom a given country i trades that are 
members of the same RTA as country i. EP denotes environmental provisions. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is a 
population weighted mean concentration of PM2.5. Year and country fixed effects are 







Table 4. Determinants of Convergence in PM2.5 Emissions 
 Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PM2.5     
Independent Variables:         
Dummy RTA with EP -0.0911* 
    [0.0543] 
   Weighted EP score 
 
-0.00669*** 
   
 
[0.00121] 






 Depth weighted score  
   
-0.0178*** 
 
   
[0.00346] 
Dummy RTA no EP -0.121*** -0.00801 0.00872 -0.0442 
 
[0.0263] [0.0341] [0.0353] [0.0308] 
Ln land per capita ratio 0.168*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.210*** 
 
[0.0584] [0.0619] [0.0619] [0.0620] 
Ln population ratio 0.0943 0.158 0.162 0.151 
 
[0.103] [0.139] [0.139] [0.139] 
Ln GDP per capita 
predicted ratio -0.00588 -0.0139 -0.0140 -0.0139 
 
[0.0321] [0.0351] [0.0351] [0.0351] 
Ln trade ratio -0.00268* -0.00412** -0.00408** -0.00414** 
 
[0.00152] [0.00184] [0.00184] [0.00184] 
Ln exports predict 0.264 -0.467 -0.480 -0.448 
 
[0.637] [0.743] [0.742] [0.747] 
Lagged ln ESPI ratio -0.0179** -0.0249** -0.0248** -0.0252** 
 
[0.00911] [0.0110] [0.0110] [0.0109] 
R
2
 within 0.040 0.055 0.056 0.052 
Number of 
observations 10,556 7,020 7,020 7,020 
Number of countries 812 540 540 540 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. L. denotes the lag operator, 
indicating that the first lag of the corresponding variable is used in the analysis. Ln denotes natural 
logarithms. The dependent variable is a population weighted mean concentration of PM2.5. Time and 
country fixed effects, not reported to save space, are included in all columns. EP denotes environmental 











Note: The figures are population weighted mean exposure. Source: OECD Green Growth Headline 





























Figure 2. Economy-Wide Environmental Policy Stringency  Indicator 
 






A. 1. Growth Empirics and Gravity Model estimations 
A.1.1 Growth Empirics 
As emphasized by Frankel and Rose (2005), trade flows, regional agreements and 
pollutant’s emissions and environmental regulations may affect income. Therefore, 
we predict real income with a number of variables, namely lagged income per capita 
(GDPcapi,t-1), conditional convergence hypothesis, population (pop), investment per 
income (I/GDP) and human capital formation. The latter is approximated by the rate 
of school enrolment (in primary school, School1, and secondary school, School2). The 
predicted values (linear projection) of this equation are used to calculate GDPcapit 
and GDPcapjt. 
 
            
               
                          
 
   
 
   
                                      
     
          (A.1) 
where nit is the growth rate of population and uit is a random term that is assumed to 
be independently and identically distributed and with a constant variance. Model 
(A.1) is estimated using panel-data estimation techniques, mainly assuming that the 
country-unobserved heterogeneity (time invariant factors that determine GDP per 




The income equation is taken from Baghdadi et al. (2013). The main 
difference between the model specified in (A.1) and the income equation in Frankel 
and Rose (2005) and Ghosh and Yamarik (2006) is that the Frankel and Rose (2005) 
also include trade openness as an explanatory variable and Ghosh and Yamarik (2006) 
include an RTA variable in addition to trade openness. We relegate trade openness and 
trade policy factors to the error term (unexplained part of the income model), since we 
are interested in predicting changes in GDP per capita that are explained by factors 
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 The model with country fixed effect is preferred to a random effects model because the error term is 
correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity and hence does not provide consistent estimates. 
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different from trade and trade policy. In this way, we obtain a “pure” scale effect that 




A.1.2 Gravity Model with Geographical Determinants 
The predicted multilateral openness and the bilateral trade variables used in 
models (1) and (2) above are obtained from a gravity model of trade, which is 
estimated using a large panel-dataset on pair-wise trade flows. The standard gravity 
model states that trade between countries is positively determined by their size (GDP, 
population and land area) and negatively determined by geographical and cultural 
distance. The geographical variables are exogenously determined and hence are 
suitable instruments for trade (Frankel and Romer, 1999). We follow Badinger’s 
(2008) specification of the gravity model, in which bilateral trade openness is 
regressed on countries’ populations (Popit, Popjt), land area (Areaij=Areai*Areaj), 
distance (Dij), a common border dummy (Adjij), a common language dummy (Langij) 
and a landlocked variable (Landlok= sum of a landlocked dummy of countries i and j). 
Two other variables are included in order to be consistent with the theoretical model: 
a measure of similarity of country size (Landcapit/Landcapjt) and remoteness from the 




                  
                                             
                                          
                                            
(A.2)
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          . 
 Where    
   is a common continent dummy. This variable will then be equal to zero if countries are on 
the same continent. Remote is then the log of the average value of the mean distances of countries i and 
j from all other countries. 
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Finally, from equation (A.2) the exponent of the fitted values across bilateral trading 
partners                                is aggregated to obtain a prediction of 
total trade for each country and year. 
 
                                 (A.3)  
     
Both, the bilateral prediction and the aggregated bilateral prediction are used as 
regressors in the environment-damage model (2) and the later is also used in model 
(1). By using these predicted values, we are able to isolate the part of trade that is 
explained exclusively by geographical, cultural and time-invariant country-specific 
factors. Other policy changes that could also explain trade variations are relegated to 
the unexplained part of the model (error term). 
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A. 2. Commitment Index of EPs in RTAs and List of RTAs with EPs 
 
Table A2.1. Indicators and criteria of Environmental commitment in RTAs 
































1. General     15.0 
1.1. Preamble Does the Preamble refer to environmental and/or sustainable 
development? 
B 3.0 
1.2  Chapter Is there a specific chapter on environmental or sustainable 
development issues? 
B 7.0 
1.2  Side agreement Is there a specific side agreement devoted to environmental 
or sustainable development issues, or environmental 
cooperation? 
B 5.0 
2. Exceptions     5.0 
2.1. GATT/GATS 
Does the agreement incorporate the general exceptions for 
environmental matters of GATT Article XX and/or GATS 
Article XIV? B 
2 
2.2. Other 
Are environmental issues identified as an exception to one or 
more specific commitments (e.g. investment, procurement, 
financial services, SPS measures, technical standards)? B 
3 
3. Environmental law     15.0 
3.1. High levels of 
environmental protection 
3.1.1. Is there a provision relating to laws and policies that 
provide for high levels of environmental protection? 
B 1.5 
  3.1.2. Does the provision provide a binding commitment? D 1.5 
3.2. Non-deviation from 
environmental law 
3.2.1. Does the provision aim that parties do not deviate from 
their environmental laws in order to encourage trade or 
investment, or in any other manner affecting trade or 
investment? 
B 1.5 
  3.1.2. Does the provision provide a binding commitment? D 1.5 
3.3. Improvement of 
environmental law 
3.3.1. Do the parties agree in the provision to strive to 
improve their levels of environmental protection? 
B 1.5 
  3.1.2. Does the provision provide a binding commitment? D 1.5 
3.4. Effective enforcement 
of  environmental law 
3.4.1. Do the Parties agree to effectively enforce their 
environmental laws, in so far as they affect trade or 
investment? 
B 1.5 
  3.1.2. Does the provision provide a binding commitment? D 1.5 
3.5. Access to remedies 3.5.1. Do the Parties commit to provide effective access to 
remedies for violations of their environmental laws? 
B 1.5 
  3.1.2. Does the provision provide a binding commitment? D 1.51 
4. Public participation     9.00 
4.1. General Does the agreement provide for public participation in 
implementing its environmental provisions? 
D 3.00 
4.2. Mandatory nature Are requirements for public participation mandatory? D 3.00 
 41 
4.3. Public submissions Is there a mechanism for public submissions on non-
enforcement of environmental laws? 
D 3.00 
5. Dispute settlement     6.00 
5.1. Consultation process Is there a specific consultation process for environmental 
issues? 
D 1.50 
5.2. Dispute settlement Is there an arbitration procedure for disputes not settled by 
consultation? 
D 1.50 
5.3. Binding Is the dispute settlement binding? D 1.50 
5.4. Environmental 
expertise 
Must the arbitration panel include members with 
environmental expertise? 
D 1.50 
6. Partnership and co-operation 
  
  5.00 
6.1. General 6.1.1. Does the agreement provide for cooperation on 
environmental matters? 
B 1.00 
  6.1.2. Is the use of cooperation binding? D 1.00 
6.2. Cooperation 
mechanism 





Are the details of environmental cooperation activities defined? B 1.50 
7. Specific 
environmental issues 
(included in the main RTA or in a cooperation agreement)   30 
7.1. Environmental 
goods and services 
7.1.1. Does the agreement include provisions for  environmental 
goods and/or services? 
B 0.5 
7.1.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.2. Renewable energy 7.2.1. Does the agreement include provisions for renewable 
energy? 
B 0.5 
7.2.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 




7.3.1. Does the agreement include provisions for energy 
conservation? 
B 0.5 
7.3.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.4. Climate change 7.4.1. Does the agreement include provisions for climate change? B 0.5 
7.4.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.5. Biodiversity 7.5.1. Does the agreement include provisions for 
biodiversity/ecosystems? 
B 0.5 
7.5.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.6. Invasive species 7.6.1. Does the agreement include provisions for invasive 
species? 
B 0.5 
7.6.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.7. Air quality 7.7.1. Does the agreement include provisions for air quality? B 0.5 
7.7.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.8. Water quality or 
water resources 
7.8.1. Does the agreement include provisions for water quality or 
resources? 
B 0.5 
7.8.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
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7.9. Soil quality 7.9.1. Does the agreement include provisions for soil quality? B 0.5 
7.9.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.10. Marine pollution 7.10.1. Does the agreement include provisions for marine 
pollution? 
B 0.5 
7.10.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 




7.12.1. Does the agreement include provisions for fisheries 
resources? 
B 0.5 
7.12.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.13. Forest resources 7.13.1. Does the agreement include provisions for forest 
resources? 
B 0.5 
7.13.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.14. Illegal timber 7.14.1. Does the agreement include provisions for illegal timber? B 0.5 
7.14.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.15. Desertification 7.15.1. Does the agreement include provisions for 
desertification? 
B 0.5 
7.15.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
7.16. Other issues 7.16.1. Does the agreement include provisions for any other 
specific issues? 
B 0.5 
7.16.2. Do they provide for concrete, enforceable actions (going 
beyond examples of possible cooperation)? 
D 1.5 
8. Implementation mechanism 
  
  5.0 
8.1. Implementation body Does the agreement establish a specific environmental 
body responsible for implementing its environmental 
provisions? 
D 3 
8.2. Responsibilities Are the responsibilities of this environmental body 
defined in detail? 
D 2 
9. Multilateral environmental agreements 
  
  10 
9.1. General MEAs 9.1.1. Is there a provision relating to existing obligations 
in MEAs? 
B 4 
  9.1.2. Is the MEA provision a binding commitment? D 3 
9.2. Specific MEAs 9.2.1. Are these specific MEAs listed individually? D 3 
  
Total 100 
Note: B indicates the items that are used to calculate the breadth component of the index and D denotes 
the items used to calculate the depth component. The figures in the last column indicate the score given 
to each environmental provision included in each agreement. 
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Table A2.2 List of RTAs with Environmental Provisions 
 
RTA Name year 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) 
1994 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
1994 
Colombia - Mexico 1995 
Canada - Chile 1997 
EU - Tunisia 1998 
Chile - Mexico 1999 
Economic and Monetary Community of 
Central Africa, CEMAC 
1999 
EU - South Africa 2000 
US - Jordan 2001 
Canada - Costa Rica 2002 
EFTA-Jordan 2002 
EU - Jordan 2002 
EC (25)+ Enlargement 2004 
EFTA-Chile 2004 
EU-Egypt 2004 
US - Chile 2004 
US - Colombia 2004 
US - Singapore 2004 
Japan - Mexico 2005 
Japan - Mexico 2005 
US - Australia 2005 
Chile - China 2006 
Guatemala - Chinese Taipei 2006 
Japan - Malaysia 2006 
Korea, Republic of - Singapore 2006 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 2006 
US - Bahrain 2006 
US - Morocco 2006 
Chile - Japan 2007 
EFTA-Egypt 2007 
Japan - Thailand 2007 
 Chinese Taipei - Nicaragua - 2008 
EU-CARIFORUM 2008 
Japan - ASEAN 2008 
Japan - Brunei Darussalam  2008 
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Japan - Indonesia 2008 
Japan - Philippines 2008 
New Zealand - China 2008 
Panama - Chile 2008 
Canada - EFTA 2009 
Canada - Peru 2009 
Chile - Colombia 2009 
China - Singapore 2009 
Colombia - Northern Triangle (El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras) 
2009 
Japan - Switzerland 2009 
Panama - Guatemala (Panama - Central 
America) 
2009 
Panama - Honduras (Panama - Central 
America ) 
2009 
Panama - Nicaragua (Panama - Central 
America) 
2009 
US - Oman 2009 
US - Peru 2009 
New Zealand - Malaysia 2010 
Canada - Colombia 2011 
EU - Korea, Republic of 2011 
India - Japan 2011 
India-Malaysia 2011 
Japan - India 2011 
Peru - Korea, Republic of 2011 
Turkey - Chile 2011 
Japan - Peru 2012 
Korea, Republic of - US 2012 
Panama - Peru 2012 
Peru - Mexico 2012 
US-Panama 2012 
EU - Colombia and Peru 2013 
Korea, Republic of - Turkey 2013 
Switzerland-China 2013 
EU - Moldova 2014 
Source:  WTO RTA Database and the author’s elaboration. Only RTAs that went into effect before 2011 
are considered in the regression analysis. The dummy rtaenvint takes the value of 1 six months after the 
RTA went into effect, zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX 3. Results for NOx and CO2 and Results for 48 Countries and Dif-GMM for PM2.5  
Table A3.1 Results for NOx and CO2 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: NOx per capita CO2 per capita 
 Independent Variables: 
    
    
N
c
 RTAs with EP -0.000424 
   
-0.00442***    
 [0.00240] 
   
[0.000900]    









 [0.00388]   









  [0.00572]  
Depth weighted score  
   
-0.237**    -0.0637*** 
 
   
[0.101]    [0.0121] 
N
c
 RTAs without EP 0.00193 0.00624** 0.00682** 0.00486** -0.00147 -0.000914 -0.000832 -0.00110 
 [0.00259] [0.00289] [0.00321] [0.00236] [0.00133] [0.00136] [0.00136] [0.00134] 
Ln population 0.737* 0.864** 0.859** 0.862** -0.191 -0.170 -0.171 -0.168 
 [0.392] [0.336] [0.335] [0.337] [0.270] [0.266] [0.266] [0.266] 
Ln GDP per capita 
predicted 1.849*** 1.758*** 1.765*** 1.746*** 2.558*** 2.655*** 2.653*** 2.659*** 
 [0.262] [0.224] [0.225] [0.223] [0.356] [0.354] [0.354] [0.354] 
(Ln GDP per capita 
predicted)
2
 -0.0851*** -0.0805*** -0.0810*** -0.0797*** -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 [0.0193] [0.0160] [0.0160] [0.0159] [0.0208] [0.0208] [0.0208] [0.0208] 
Ln predicted openness  -0.0103 -0.00951 -0.00957 -0.00943 0.000817** 0.000817** 0.000817** 0.000819** 
 
[0.00879] [0.00875] [0.00876] [0.00873] [0.000344] [0.000343] [0.000343] [0.000343] 
Ln ESPI (3lags) -0.0623 -0.0587 -0.0602 -0.0558 -0.07111** -0.07448** -0.07475** -0.07389** 
F-test Prob. [0.0408] [0.0420] [0.0421] [0.0419] [0.0148] [0.0146] [0.0146] [0.0147] 
R
2 
within 0.438 0.447 0.447 0.446 0.646 0.637 0.569 0.635 
Number of observations 456 456 456 456 514 514 514 514 
Number of countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Note: N
c
 denotes the number of countries with whom a given country i trades that are members of the same RTA as country i. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variables are the natural log of nitrogen oxide per capita (NOx) and the natural log of carbon dioxide per capita (CO2). Time and country 
fixed effects are included in all columns. EP denotes environmental provisions. ESPI denotes Environmental Stringency Policy Index. 
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 denotes the number of countries with whom a given country i trades that are members of the 
same RTA as country i. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The 
specifications in this sample exclude the environmental stringency performance index, which is only 
available for 30 countries. The dependent variable is a population weighted mean concentration of 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variable: PM2.5 
    
 Independent 
Variables: 
        
N
c
 RTAs with EP -0.00306*** 
    [0.000880] 
   Weighted EP score 
 
-0.0105*** 
   
 
[0.00382] 







 Depth weighted 
score  
   
-0.0325*** 
 




 RTAs without 
EP 0.00134 -0.000174 -0.000148 -0.000232 
 [0.00130] [0.00114] [0.00114] [0.00113] 
Ln population 0.531** 0.516** 0.517** 0.512** 
 [0.239] [0.238] [0.239] [0.238] 
Ln GDP per capita 
predicted 1.935*** 1.977*** 1.977*** 1.976*** 
 [0.529] [0.533] [0.533] [0.532] 
(Ln GDP per capita 
predicted)
2
 -0.120*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.122*** 
 [0.0298] [0.0301] [0.0301] [0.0301] 
Ln predicted 
openness  0.00171*** 0.00169*** 0.00169*** 0.00169*** 
 [0.000447] [0.000450] [0.000450] [0.000450] 
     
Turning point 3173.21 3302.57 3402.38 3357.16 
R
2
 within 0.174 0.167 0.167 0.168 
Number of 
observations 
570 570 570 570 
Number of 
countries 
48 48 48 48 
 47 
 
Table A.3.3. Results for PM2.5. Dif-GMM Estimations (48 countries sample) 
  (1) 
Dependent Variable: PM2.5 
 Independent Variables: 
 N
c





 RTAs without EP 0.00280 
 
[0.00199] 
Ln population 0.460** 
 [0.190] 
Ln GDP per capita predicted 0.892*** 
 [0.224] 





Ln predicted openness 0.00279 
 
[0.00398] 
Lagged ln PM2.5 0.435*** 
 
[0.0676] 




Number of observations 477 
Number of countries 48 
Hansen test (prob) 0.108 
Note: N
c
 denotes the number of countries with whom a given country i trades that are 
members of the same RTA as country i. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.10.  Ln denotes natural logarithms. The model is estimated with the variables in first differences. 
The Hansen test results cannot reject the validity of the instruments. EP denotes environmental 
provisions. RTAs with EP and the lagged dependent variable are considered to be endogenous. The 
long run elasticity is calculated as the coefficient of RTAs with EPs divided by one minus the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (Lagged ln PM2.5). The dependent variable is a population 
weighted mean concentration of PM2.5. Time fixed effects are included. 
 
 
